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INTEGRATION MATURITY OF HUNGARY: 
EUROPEANISATION AND ECONOMIC ELITE IN HUNGARY  
 
Tibor PALANKAI* 
    
Abstract 
Present Hungarian elite was born from process of transformation after 1990. 
Hungarian economy has become one of the most globalised economies of the world, and 
integrated to Europe. In business elite two generations are distinguished. The older 
generation was already in manager or owner position before the system changed, but they 
did not come from Communist political nomenclature. The second generation finished their 
university studies in the late 1980s, without any initial capita, and their emergence showed 
greater similarities to Western contemporaries. Others are present managers and 
technocrats of big companies (TNCs and national as well), bankers and also from SMEs. 
The main group is from the political and public administration bureaucracy, who is in 
important positions at ministries, local authorities or at European institutions. The 
Hungarian elite is Europeanised, but divided, because some part, particularly national 
companies and SMEs are negatively affected by process of European integration. 
Keywords: Integration Maturity, Transformation, Europeanisation, Business and 
Economic Elite. 
 
MACARİSTAN’IN BÜTÜNLEŞME OLGUNLUĞU:  
MACARİSTAN EKONOMİK ELİTİNİN AVRUPALILAŞMASI  
 
Özet 
Şuanki Macar eliti 1990 sonrasından yaşanan dönüşüm sürecinden doğmuştur. 
Macar ekonomisi Avrupa ile bütünleşmiş ve dünyanın en küresel ekonomilerinden biri 
olmuştur. İş eliti çerçevesinde iki nesil göze çarpmaktadır. Komünist siyasi nomenklatürden 
gelmeyen eski nesil, sistem değişmeden önce ya kendi işinin sahibi ya da yönetici 
konumundaydı. Üniversite çalışmalarını 1980’lerin sonlarına doğru bitiren ikinci nesil ise, 
başlangıç sermayesi olmayıp Batılı çağdaşlarıyla benzer özellikler taşımaktadır. Diğerleri 
ise büyük şirketlerin (ulusaşırı ve ulusal şirketler) şuanki müdürleri ve teknokratları, 
bankerler ve KOBİ yöneticileridir. Siyasi ve kamu yönetimi bürokrasisinden gelen büyük 
grup ise bakanlıklar, yerel yönetimler veya Avrupa kurumlarında önemli mevkilerde 
bulunmaktadırlar. Macar eliti Avrupalılaşmıştır fakat ulusal şirketler ve KOBİ’ler başta 
                                               
* Emeritus Professor and Director of European Studies and Education Centre, Corvinus 
University of Budapest, e-mail: tibor.palankai@uni-corvinus.hu  
  
Palankai, T.                                                           DEÜ SBE Dergisi, Cilt:12, Sayı:2 
60 
 
olmak üzere bazı gruplar Avrupa bütünleşmesi sürecinden zarar gördükleri için kendi 
içinde bölünmüştür.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Bütünleşme Olgunluğu, Dönüşüm, Avrupalılaşma, İş ve 
Ekonomi Eliti 
 
INTRODUCTION 
We consider integration maturity as framework of our analysis, which 
reflects the capacity of a country to exploit benefits of integration. Integration 
maturity and Europeanisation are closely related. Integration maturity is 
conditioned by the level of Europeanisation in different fields, and high level of 
Europeanisation of a country means that with high probability it can exploit 
advantages of integration. First, we analyse the transformation of the Hungarian 
economy and society after 1988, which was accompanied by rapid global and 
European integration. We show the different ways of emergence of the Hungarian 
capitalist class, which forms one basic element of the Hungarian elite, besides the 
managers of TNCs, or the high level state bureaucracy. We show that the 
Hungarian elites are highly Europeanised, and beneficiary of European integration. 
Some are, however, at the loosing end (national companies and SMEs), and they 
represent those, who resent globalisation and European integration. A chapter is 
added about creation of European studies centres in Hungary, and their role in 
creation of the European elite. 
 
TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION OF HUNGARIAN ECONOMY 
We consider integration maturity as framework of our analysis. Integration 
maturity can be defined as a capability to exploit the benefits of the given form of 
integration to the maximum, while the costs and drawbacks can be minimised. 
Integration maturity can be measured by comparing costs and benefits. A country 
is mature for integration if membership on the whole is advantageous for it. 
Integration maturity and Europeanisation are closely related. Integration 
maturity is conditioned by the level of Europeanisation in different fields, and high 
level of Europeanisation of a country means that with high probability it can 
exploit advantages of integration. In our paper, Europeanisation and integration 
maturity are analysed in social and political dimensions. The economic elites play a 
crucial role in the process, their and the country’s success or failures are closely 
connected. 
After 1990, the Hungarian economy and society were fundamentally 
transformed and the process was accompanied by substantial modernisation and 
global adjustment. The market reforms restored the normal functioning of the 
market and by the end of 1990s Hungary was recognised as “functioning market 
economy” by the EU Commission. As result of privatisation, similar proportions of 
private sector to developed countries was created, which produced over 80% of 
GDP. Hungary became a capitalistic country. 
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The structure of economy was radically transformed. The process started 
already after the Second World War, when the formerly underdeveloped 
agricultural economy was changed to an industrial-agrarian economy, with rapid 
urbanisation. After 1990, the process took new dimensions. Between 1989 and 
2001, the proportion of agriculture in GDP shrank from 15% to 4% that of 
manufacturing from 34% to 28%, while the share of services increased from 42% 
to 67%.  The structure of Hungarian economy converged substantially to the most 
developed countries, and in fact entered into the post-industrial society. By the 
development of communication infrastructure, it made a big step towards the 
communication-information society. 
In the last 20 years, the Hungarian economy has become one of the most 
globalised economies of the world. According the KOF Globalization Index of 
2009, Hungary ranks 10th among the 189 countries of the world (11. Czech R., 13. 
Finland, 16. France, 17. Estonia, 22. Germany, 27. U.K. 32. Greece, 34. Latvia, 38. 
US.)1  
Hungary with its 10 million populations is a small country, and structurally 
is a highly open economy. The foreign trade gives about 70% of GDP, which 
means high global dependence from external factors. The high globalisation is 
based on massive inflow of foreign direct investment; between 1989 and 2009 
more than €80bn was invested in the country. The share of foreign investments in 
1990 was only 1,7% of GDP, now it is over 50%. Foreign TNCs give about 70% of 
industrial production, nearly 90% of industrial export, and more than 50% of 
employment. The outgoing investments from NMCs just started in recent years. In 
2008, the investment abroad of Hungary reached €12bn, and they are close to 15-
20% of incoming FDI, which proportion is highest in the region. But the average of 
developed countries is somewhat around 150%. The transnationalisation process is 
external and asymmetric. Hungary has few TNCs of its own (OTP, MOL, Matav), 
and they operate and expand only on regional markets of neighbour countries. The 
unevenness of the integration process is reflected also in a certain duality of local 
SME sector. Only their smaller part integrates into global economy (TNCs), while 
most of them remain outside, and still mainly oriented to local economy. 
The transformation was accompanied by rapid opening (“negative 
integration” – Tinbergen) of the economy. The foreign trade was liberalised 
(elimination of bureaucratic control of external trade, reduction of tariffs and 
subsidies) during 1988-1993, and up to 2000 the country engaged into free trade 
with most of the European countries. It meant a free trade association with the EU 
(Europe Agreements), free trade arrangement with EFTA and other countries of the 
region (CEFTA – Central European Free Trade Agreement). By 1989 the 
Hungarian forint was convertible on current account, which was extended to capital 
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account convertibility by 1996, and from 2001, the HUF have become fully 
convertible. By entering the EU in 2004 as a full member, Hungary has become a 
globally open economy not only in structural terms, but also in institutional and 
economic policy dimensions. 
The high globalisation means, in fact, a high Europeanisation of Hungarian 
economy. Traditionally more than 80-85% of Hungarian foreign trade was 
conducted with other European countries. Since 1989, the trade intensity (share in 
GDP) has highly increased, and at the same time, it was reoriented towards the 
European Union. In 1990, the share of EC in Hungarian foreign trade was only 
about 25-30%, which increased already by 1993 (prior to Europe Agreements) 
above 50%, and it is now around 75%. 
The process of integration with Europe was basically promoted by foreign 
TNCs, based on their massive FDIs (dis-location) during the last 20 years. The EU 
membership boosted this process further, particularly up to 2008, but it remains 
open how this continues after the present economic crisis is over. The EU 
integration brought about 2-2.5% growth “surplus” for the country. Hungary’s per 
capita income in the 1960s were around 60% of the European average, and it 
was about 50% higher than that of Portugal and Greece. By early 1990, due to 
structural crisis of Soviet system, and then the “transformation recession” it 
fell back to around 43%. Per capita GDP of Hungary now is around 62% of 
that of EU27 (of course above data are not comparable with 1960s, but show 
the trend). Now, Portugal and Greece is still about 50% above the Hungarian 
level. Re-convergence had an encouraging start, but it was broken by the 2008-
2009 recession. While on the whole the integration brought substantial gains 
for the country, not all part of the economy was benefiting of it. As result of 
EU membership, large number of small and medium firms, inefficient small farms 
(hundred thousands of semi-subsistence farms), and the capital-intensive service 
sectors seems to be at the loosing end, as result of increased competition. 
 
PRIVATISATION AS MAJOR ELEMENT OF TRANSFORMATION 
The end of 1980s was marked by the collapse of the Soviet system in 
Central and Eastern Europe, provoked by deep political, economic and social crisis, 
demonstrating the failure of bureaucratic central planning, and the popular 
rejection of one party system. In the years of 1989-90, the Communist party 
dominated political structures were replaced by multi-party parliamentary 
democracies, and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe embarked on 
fundamental transformation of their economies and societies.  
The economic transformation in itself has several aspects. 
1. Internal transformation of the socio-economic structures: marketisaton 
and privatisation 
2. External aspects of transformation - international (re-)integration 
The European Union’s Trade Strategy …             DEÜ SBE Dergisi, Cilt:12, Sayı:2 
63 
 
2.1 Opening the formerly closed national (planned) economies 
(“negative integration”) 
2.1.1. Elimination of trade monopoly of state, and liberalization of 
foreign trade 
  2.1.2. Convertibility of national currencies 
  2.1.3. Liberalization of foreign investments  
   2.2. Integration (re-integration) into the world economy  
2.2.1. Joining international institutions (IMF, OECD, CEFTA, NATO)  
2.2.2. Associating (joining) the EU as a strategic integration partner 
(“positive integration”). 
From point of view of economic and social transformation the privatisation 
played a crucial role. Privatisation was the most important strategic development 
toward transformation of economies and societies of Central and Eastern European 
countries. While certain sort of marketisation was accepted by the reform 
countries, the privatisation was rejected until the end of 1980s by the Party 
leaderships in all CEEcs. Socialism and communism were defined as public sector 
economies and any privatisation was thought as a break with basic Marxist 
principles and therefore it was a political and ideological taboo all the time. The 
privatisation created new economic elite of the country.  
It must be noted, that the elements of private sector survived even the most 
severe Stalinist periods, and they usually revived in the times of relaxation of the 
political course. The process has become marked particularly from the beginning of 
1980s. The privatisation process, therefore, was not without antecedent, it can not 
be understood without this, particularly as far as Hungary is concerned. 
1. Private sector prevailed in retail, repair, services and handicrafts (except 
for the SU or Cuba). 
2. Private plots were allowed in agriculture for co-operative members, all 
the time, and in some fields they played important role in market supply (in 
Hungary, since the 1960s a peculiar symbiosis of the co-operative sector 
and the almost unconstrained small-scale household production) 
 3. There was a sizeable second economy ("black economy" or 
"moonlighting") and it flourished particularly in the reform economies and 
periods of relaxation. 
 4.  Loose forms of co-operatives were developed, where there were broad 
possibilities of private initiatives and entrepreneurship, particularly from 
the 1980s (Hungary, Poland and the SU after 1987). 
 5. Entrepreneurship in the public sectors was increasingly recognized 
(profit motives, innovation, managerial skills and attitudes), which lead to 
the development of performance and profit motivated managers (in 
Hungary already after 1968).  
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 6. Although, the capital markets did not exist, in Hungary from the early 
1980s public utility bond or shares were issued to private persons 
(telephone, water supply etc.).  
7. The number of joint ventures with Western firms gradually increased, 
particularly in the 1980s. 
In the simplest definition, on micro level, privatisation is the transfer or 
exchange of public assets to private persons, while in macro terms it is a process, 
which leads to the dominance of the private sector or the creation of a private 
market economy. In a broader approach, some define privatisation as destatization, 
reduction of the role of the state in general.  
In general, there are four major ways of creation of private market 
economy in CEE:  
1. Establishment of new private companies. One major way of 
privatisation is through the private investments and establishment of 
firms (Gründung) and their increase and expansion. This is a 
continuous, organic, evolutionary process, which is the natural 
characteristic of a healthy market economy. This can be connected to 
the withdrawal of state companies from given fields and leaving the 
market for entering private investors. The private capital may be 
simply invested into state companies, transforming them into private 
business.   
In fact, in most of those CEEcs, which have chosen market privatisation, 
great part of the private sector has been created by the establishment and expansion 
of an indigenous private sector brought into existence by investing and setting up 
new "start-up" firms and entities, and not directly by privatisation. The same 
applies to foreign companies, which in particularly certain fields (manufacturing, 
shopping centres etc.) have overwhelmingly been (in 60-70%) results of "green 
field investments", rather than buying or acquiring existing firms. Sometimes, 
however, it is difficult to distinguish, because the new firms are built indirectly on 
the "ruins" of some former entities.  
2.  Through privatisation. In the West, market-privatisations dominate: 
selling companies, state stocks, auctions and tenders, or management 
or employee buyouts. In the case of the privatisation of individual 
companies, initial public offering (IPO) is often applied. It can be made 
through an open tender or direct invitation of potential buyers. The 
main agents in privatisation may be private or legal persons 
(companies).  
In CEEcs, several forms of privatisation (central direct selling of assets, 
open tenders etc.) have been applied. The important forms were the "manager" and 
"employee" privatisations (buy outs). Voucher (or coupon) privatisation was 
planned or started in many countries (Czech and Slovak Republic, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Mongolia, Rumania, Russia, Ukraine etc.). In Hungary, voucher 
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privatisation has been rejected, but the "compensation" or restitution bonds can be 
considered as vouchers. 
Privatisation through selling companies to foreign firms was also broadly 
applied. Privatisations by foreigners, however, concentrated mostly to certain fields 
(food processing, sugar, alcohol, tobacco and paper industry, and also to some 
strategic sectors like energy or telecommunication). In ailing and declining sectors 
or companies in trouble, there was a general lack of interest, while some critics 
claimed that the cream of the state sector was skimmed by just the foreign 
investors. The main foreign investors were the transnational companies or the 
former trade partners or others with close personal connections.  
3. Through re-privatisation. In the West, it is conceived, as re-
transferring of formerly nationalized sectors or companies into private 
hands, in general. In this case, the former owners were compensated 
for nationalization in most cases with fair price. In the East, in general, 
there was no compensation. Re-privatisation is, therefore, defined, as 
some sort of direct or indirect restoration of original ownership on 
nationalized or confiscated properties. In Hungary, direct re-
privatisation was limited only to church property (related to church 
functions) and restoration of some land ownership, combined with 
restitution bonds. In other countries, in some cases, the properties were 
given directly back to former owners. 
4. Through the simple shrinkage or collapse of the state sector 
(bankruptcies, liquidation, cutting production, closing down factories 
or stealing assets). In case, ailing or outdated sectors or capacities, this 
was one of the main forms of “privatisation”.  
 
GENESIS OF THE NEW ECONOMIC (BUSINESS) ELITE IN HUNGARY  
The development of post-Soviet capitalism shows several characteristics. 
“One of the main specificity of transition form state socialism to market capitalism 
is its inorganic character. Historically, it is the first time that before the transition to 
capitalism there was no (considerable) capital owner class; consequently, the 
capitalism should be created without capitalists.” (Kolosi – Szelényi, 2010:10) 
In this respect, the countries of the regions differed substantially. In the 
reform countries (like Hungary or Poland), the private sector emerged and gained 
strength already in the 1970s and 1980s, and that made possible certain capital 
accumulation. Due to marketisation measures after 1868, the autonomy of 
managers in the state sector increased, they behaved (sometimes had to), like their 
capitalist counterparts. This generation was already in managerial or owner 
position before the system changes, and they used their capital accumulated during 
the socialism for making their fortune later. The second generation of new rich had 
a different way of carrier, they finished their university studies in the late 1980s, 
Palankai, T.                                                           DEÜ SBE Dergisi, Cilt:12, Sayı:2 
66 
 
without any initial capital, and their emergence showed greater similarities to that 
of their Western contemporaries.  
In both generations the technocratic-managerial backgrounds played 
important role. Most of business elite have university diploma, there are rare 
exceptions, that they have lower education. Of course, in the sphere of lower 
levels, particularly in the SMEs, there are many less educated, and we know the 
phenomenon of “lumpen-bourgeoisie”, in many cases related to illegal or criminal 
economy. 
Contrary to some assumptions, the first generation did not come from 
Communist political nomenclature; there are only few exceptions that somebody 
from the former party elite got into the capitalist owner club. That particularly 
applies to the older generation. Those close to pension, proved to be the “lost 
generation”, and they could hardly preserve even their previous positions. There 
are, however, many from the then middle aged party bureaucrats, who ended up in 
certain private business, but mostly in peripheral activities (setting up of an ostrich 
farm), and they definitely do not belong to the present business elite. This 
contradicts to the theory of “political capitalism” as a main hypothesis of post-
socialist transformation, proposed originally by Jadwiga Staniszkis and Elemér 
Hankiss. “It is a fact, that there were attempts to convert political capital to 
economic one, but these, almost in each case, failed, or even best case, they can be 
only half-successes.” (Kolosi – Szelényi, 2010: 25) Hankiss-Staniszkis 
assumptions, however, apply to Russia, although, that due to Gorbatchow policies, 
many young people got into the Soviet political nomenclature in the 1980s, and 
they became the main beneficiaries of privatisation.  
One of the main gainers of the market transformation was the 
representatives of “late Kadarian technocracy”. They have university diploma, 
mostly as engineers or economist, but many of them were lawyers or even medical 
doctors. They had the necessary professional training, but also wide managerial 
experiences and international connection, both in business spheres or public 
administration. Their cultural and network capital was satisfactory enough for 
exploiting the opportunities offered by privatisation. 
Typical cases were the “bankers”, who made their carrier and fortune in the 
financial spheres. They used the stock options and they became the main 
beneficiaries of bank privatisation. Later many made their fortune in financial 
sectors as brokers or traders of different financial services and assets. The 
privatisation leasing was also a lucrative business. 
As the program mass privatisation started, the problem of lack of initial 
capital had to be addressed. There were two way for it. One was the so called E-
Credit (Existence Credit), which was given exclusively for privatisation and for 
Hungarian citizens. The interest rate was 3-4% (while the current interest rate was 
about 30%), and its maturity was 10-12 years. In case, even 90% of the 
privatisation project could be financed that way. The other was the so called 
restitution bonds, which was based on re-privatisation, and it was a certain voucher 
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for compensation for the former owner, who lost their property during the 
Communist period through nationalisation or confiscation. As we noted above, 
beyond that, the notion of voucher privatisation was rejected by Hungary, and it 
was the only country, which insisted exclusively on market privatisation.  
The main forms of privatisation by the managerial and technocratic class 
were the so called management buy outs and setting up new business. The two was 
often combined. The managers bought their managed companies or they took part 
in the so called employee’s shared ownership programs. Later could mean joint 
ownership with the employees, but in many cases, it ended up by buying out 
gradually the majority of the shares or the whole company by someone. The 
manager privatisation was often called privatisation by “deputies”. The top, the 
number one managers were even in the late Kadarian period’s political appointees, 
and the real management of the company or institution was left to the professional 
deputies. While the former ones were largely discredited, the “deputies” had all the 
capacities and at the same time the network capital to successfully compete in the 
privatisation process. 
Some of the later business elite started in former private business. The 
small business in handicrafts, in repair, in restaurants or the private practice of 
doctors (dentists) was tolerated even during the harshest Communist times. Some 
of them successfully developed their business after 1990, but there are only few 
exceptions, who become billionaires. The other possibility was to start from the 
second economy, which was partly legal, particularly connected with the 
agricultural cooperatives, and partly could be called as a real “second economy” as 
far as it meant semi-legal or illegal activities, mostly in trade. For the later, the 
typical example was the import of computer or communication-information 
products and technologies, which were under COCOM restrictions, but which 
were, however, informally tolerated as they served “strategic interests” of the 
country.  
The financial sources and support for privatisation process was, of course, 
not enough. It had to be combined with entrepreneurial and risk taking capacities. 
Information and imagination were also important. For bank credit, collateral, 
knowledge and network capital was also needed. 
The case was different with the second generation. Among them, two 
separate way of carrier can be distinguished. A great part of them, relied on their 
political positions, but their political capital was accumulated already after the 
systemic changes. Some belonged to the late Kadarian political elite, they were 
functionaries of the Communist Youth Organisation, but they actively participated 
in democratic transformation, which gave them legitimacy in the emerging new 
democratic structures. Many others built up their carrier in the newly emerging 
democratic parties. The political capital was particularly important in the earlier 
periods of privatisation (1992-96); these were the years of getting rich rapidly. The 
corruption cases demonstrate that their importance remained until recently.  
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The other part relied on its knowledge and business capacities. Many of the 
present business elite started as inventors, innovators or they come from the 
scientific research fields. The typical spheres are the software business, the 
computers trade and development, new medicines, health treatments, 
communication and the eco-business. Some started from scratch (from garage), and 
made a spectacular rise on the business ladder. Their carrier is the most similar to 
that of Western counterparts, who made their success overwhelmingly on their 
special knowledge and talent. For them, besides the good entrepreneurial 
capacities, the good political network capital (gaining public tenders) is also 
equally important.  
A part of the new elite based its carrier and success on its income or capital 
brought “home” from abroad. These were old (leaving the country in 1956 or 
before) or later émigrés (leaving in the 1970s and 1980s), or those, for example 
from foreign trade, who managed to accumulate capital abroad before 1989. Their 
share, however, remained fairly modest, particularly contrary to Baltic countries, 
and there are only few, who got into the upper class of the richest capitalists. It is a 
Hungarian specificity that the Hungarian business elite is rooted rather in the 
domestic economy.  
“In Central-Europe the ownership relations are consolidated, the new 
capitalist class can be considered to be established. The politics is rather dependent 
on it, than it depends on politics. Contrary to that the private property is far not 
consolidated either in Russia, or in China, although the fluidity of ownership 
relations has opposite character. In China, one can be a billionaire through 
managerial way, and then he must look for political protection. Contrary to that, in 
Russia, the big capitalists are appointed by politics, and then they can be deprived 
of their property (or even from their freedom) by almost completely as one 
pleases.” (Kolosi – Szelényi, 2010: 283) 
A great part of the Hungarian economic elite, in its strict sense, is not from 
the capitalist owner class. These are the present managers and technocrats, 
although, many of them have decent fortune and can be considered as rich, but 
their high incomes are based on their professional performance. These are the 
managers and high technocrats of big companies (TNCs and national as well), 
bankers and working in different fields of economic life. Many are working for 
consulting firms, in research fields or they are simply free lancers, but having 
regular assignments as high experts from both private or public sector. These are 
high level trained experts or people working in different strategic position of 
business or political sphere. Some of them are crucial figures of economic elite as 
far as they sit in strategic positions of decision making. There are a great number of 
journalists, who play particularly important role in forming public opinion in 
economic and business matters. Some of these people make occasional “excursion” 
to political life, but their existence is not based on politics. A big group of these 
elite is from the political bureaucracy, who is in important positions at ministries, 
local authorities or at international institutions. The elite representing Hungary at 
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the different EU institutions has to be particularly mentioned. These are close to 
business elite, in some sense, they definitely belong to it. 
 
IMPACT OF EUROPEANISATION AND THE ELITE 
The globalisation is accompanied with growing inequities. The 
proportions, due to lack of proper statistics, are broadly disputed, but the main 
trends of the last decades can be hardly denied. The increased inequities can be 
shown between different social classes or groups, between regions and countries as 
well. Regional disproportion has increased inside the countries (such as China or 
India), but also among the main global regions (Europe, America or South-East 
Asia). 
The trends of increasing social gaps in relations to transformation and 
globalisation of Central and Eastern Europe is also marked. „Across most of 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the 1990s, a limited 
circle reaped major material gains from the new connection to global capitalism, 
while the majority of the people saw their standard of life worsen.” (Scholte, 2005: 
322) The problem for Hungary is dramatically presented by Professor Laszló 
Bogár. “The ‘local society’ of globality has emerged, elite, which represents the 
upper 5%, but owns 30-35% of the resources. On the other pole, there is the 
“negative print” of this, the junk or debris society of those, who fell out of history, 
and who represent about 20-35% and owning only 5-8% of resources. In between 
the two, their is an extremely heterogeneous middle society, which conducts a self-
exploiting struggle partly for climbing up to the local elite of globality, partly for 
escaping somehow from sliding down to the junk society.” Bogár, 2003: 340)    
The proportions may be disputed, but it is a fact that no more than 20-25% 
percent of the society is on the gaining side of transformation (globalization – 
Europeanisation), while about 10% of the society is in deep poverty, without any 
realistic hope to getting out of its situation. According to a TÁRKI research it can 
be assumed that “in these two decades, about 20-25% of families reached the 
circumstances of a decent civilian welfare in a European sense, and although their 
majority lived better than the average even before the system change, their real 
living conditions today are comparably much better than before, even so if many of 
them not always feel this way.” (Kolosi – Szelényi, 2010: 279) 
The transformation was accompanied with the emergence of a capitalist 
owner class, which we can call the main representatives of business elite of the 
country. According the statistics, there about 800.000 registered companies, 
business units in the country. A great part of them are quasi companies, which are 
created just for tax optimalisation and bring no more income than a moderate 
salary. But it can be realistically assumed that 3-5% of the society, which could be 
considered as a real capitalist owner class. Among them only few hundred are 
billionaires, and only about a dozen, who may own dollar billions. We can say 
therefore, that Hungary has a number of big capitalists, which can be considered 
rich even in international comparisons.  
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In recent years, in the Hungarian society, we can experience growing anti-
globalist and anti-European feelings. A great part of the society feels loser of the 
transformation and European integration, so the “transformation fatigue” or 
“Europe-fatigue” become a general phenomenon. The growing inequities support 
this view, and not only the poor think this way, but even the great part of the 
middle class has mixed feeling, particularly because it look its future uncertain. 
That was particularly strengthened by the recent global crisis. That helped the 
populist politicians and the lead to growing nationalistic feeling. (“We suffer now 
not from foreign (Soviet) tanks, but from foreign (Western) banks.” “Now the 
commands are coming from Brussels, instead of Moscow.”) 
This leads us to the question of Europeanisation and the Hungarian 
economic elite. The Hungarian economic elite is highly Europeanised. It is 
basically due to high Europeanisation of Hungarian economy. The birth of this elite 
was greatly influenced and determined by the fact that privatisation and the 
opening and integration of the country to Europe was parallel and closely related. 
We don’t speak about those who were connected to TNCs and foreign direct 
investments, because there this connection is entirely obvious. During the 
privatisation process there was an intensive interconnection between the foreign 
and domestic actors. The foreigner often looked at local agents, and the later were 
taken as partners. Sometimes, the money was brought from abroad, but the 
knowledge or necessary relations were given by local peoples. The external 
markets for the new enterprises were almost entirely in Europe, so the European 
orientation from the beginning was vital. There are many examples of close 
business cooperation, and again the partners are almost entirely from Europe. Most 
part of the foreign investments came from Europe, and the target countries for 
emerging Hungarian capital export are the European neighbour countries. The 
about 2/3 of the Hungarian commercial banking capital is owned by foreigners, 
mostly from Europe, the financial and banking activities orient to European 
(global) markets. After the joining, great part of elite public administration got into 
daily contacts with European Union institutions; they had to learn how to deal with 
Europe. 
The economic elite and particularly the broader business community are 
not exempted from the negative impacts and the process of disappointment. Even a 
part of the big business is calling for more “national protection”, and this is 
characteristic mainly for those national big companies (emerging Hungarian TNCs, 
like OTP or MOL), which got into conflict with their foreign competitors.  Even 
those Hungarian SMEs, which were successful to get into the networks of TNCs as 
suppliers or sub-contractors, often feel exploited, and forced into unfavourable 
conditions. This is much more the case with other SMEs, which much directly 
suffer from foreign competition, and even those who are not forced out of business, 
they feel an uncertain future. The large shopping centres and chains mean deadly 
competition for small local shops, and the death rate among them was particularly 
high in the recent years. The foreign competition was increasingly felt after the full 
membership in the EU from 2004, and the impacts could be clearly identified in 
many sectors. There is a clear increase of anti-European voices. This phenomenon 
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can be called a negative identification with Europe, namely this is also a certain 
sort of Europeanisation, but with negative consequences for the effected. 
 
INTRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN STUDIES IN 
HUNGARY – TRAINING THE ELITE 
It was recognized from the beginning, that enlargement presupposes a 
comprehensive process of preparation and adaptation of the country. In 1991 
Hungary became an associate of the European Union, and thereby by 2000 became 
part of the European free trade area. With full membership it joined the EU’s 
internal market and the common policies, and took part as full member in the work 
of EU institutions. It was clear, that this presupposes a fundamental transformation 
of Hungary’s entire economic structure and institutional system and widespread 
adaptation at every level (from companies to the state administration). This 
required the training of a large number of integration experts. 
The aim of education in European integration was to train experts whose 
basic professional knowledge has been deepened with regard to European 
integration and who are sufficiently well qualified to take part, at both micro- and 
macro- level in every area of economic and social life, in carrying out the tasks 
relating to integration. We attached particular importance to the training of experts 
capable of properly representing Hungary’s interests in the EU and the other 
international institutions (the OECD, NATO, etc.). 
In Hungarian higher education institutions, teaching and research relating 
to European integration began as long ago as the 1970s, and took off especially in 
the 1980s, so that in certain universities today (Budapest, Gödöllő, Pécs) 
substantial traditions have developed. Teaching and research in this field have been 
associated with a number of professors and researchers, who even before the 1988-
89 changes had gained international reputation and recognition. The same can be 
said of a number of experts in institutes and the state apparatus, who were likewise 
considered outstanding international experts on the subject of European integration. 
So already by 1990, Hungary had already an expert elite on European integration, 
but far not enough in number in light of integration ambitions of the country.  
In the 1990s teaching and research in Hungary relating to European 
integration became more intensive. A suitable standard was ensured where 
properly qualified experts and a research base existed, and where there were 
already long-established traditions of this kind of teaching. Elsewhere, however, 
the process has just began and it was clear, that it requires a few more years before 
teaching and research capacity of sufficient quantity and quality develops. 
In the period after 1990 teaching on the subject of European integration the 
Hungarian higher education institutions received substantial external assistance 
within the framework of the Tempus, Erasmus, Jean Monnet, PHARE, and other 
EU financing measures (exchange programs involving foreign teachers and 
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students, infrastructure development, support for research, financing of courses, 
etc.). This contributed greatly to the development of European integration studies. 
The first ever European Documentation and Research Centre were set up in 
Hungary in 1988 at Eötvös Lóránd University, and this was followed by the 
establishment of similar centres at other universities, the CUB in Budapest and the 
main universities in the provinces. These centres regularly received certain EU 
publications and infrastructure support on a case-by-case basis, and organized 
conferences, etc.  
From 1993 the EU Commission extended the Jean Monnet program first to 
Hungary and Poland in the region. From 1997 the Czech Republic was also 
included, and later the other candidate countries as well. The financial resources for 
the Jean Monnet program were provided out of Hungarian PHARE funds, on the 
basis of an agreement between the Commission and the Hungarian government. 
The program was supplemented by others measures on a case-by-case basis. 
Among these we can mention participation in ACE, in Framework Programs, and 
many individual researches and grants.  
From the academic year 1998-99 the so-called EKKŐ (European 
Scholarship for Training in Public Administration) program was launched, in 
which roughly 133 students received grants of 100,000 forints per semester for two 
years. The students had to enrol for special courses and under the terms of a 
contract, to work in the state administration for two years after graduation. 
In Hungary the teaching of European Union studies at university level 
really received comprehensive, organized government support after 1998, with the 
establishment of 12 European Studies Centres financed by the PHARE program. 
We can safely say that in Hungary by 1998 the conditions and academic 
background had been created for the establishment of European Studies Centres de 
facto at all of the Hungarian universities.  
The ESCs, in fact, began their subsidised activities in the academic year 
1998-99. The non-repayable grant of ECU (euro)3m awarded to 12 ESCs in 14 
higher education institutions was for 3 years, ending in 2001. The grants provided 
resources for teaching and research activities and for the infrastructure 
development necessary for their operation. The teaching activity of the centres 
ranged from basic training to postgraduate education, and the organization of 
profession- and target-oriented courses, chiefly for secondary school teachers, civil 
servants, media experts, businessmen and jurists. The centres drew external experts 
into the research work; the results were reported in many publications, and 
conferences and seminars were organized. With the creation of the documentation 
centres important European information services could be provided, not only in 
higher education institutions. Teaching related to EU integration, of course, went 
on in various forms in other higher education institutions as well. It was a condition 
of the grant that the universities should continue the programs for 5 years after the 
lapse in 2001 of the financial support. 
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In Hungary’s higher education institutions teaching related to European 
integration issues were being carried out in the following main forms and 
frameworks: 
EU studies are being incorporated more and more into many subjects, 
chiefly in accordance with the particular characteristics and professional 
requirements of each given specialized field (economics, law, political sciences, 
culture, engineering, medical studies etc.). The students thereby gain familiarity 
with the European integration aspects of the field in question, and acquire the most 
important knowledge that they may later need in the practice of their profession. 
The depth and nature of this varied according to the special field. Obviously the 
needs of a jurist are different from those of a vet. The incorporation of European 
integration studies into higher education courses had accelerated with the approach 
of full membership. 
Many independent courses relating to European integration have been 
launched. On the basis of figures by the academic year 2000-2001, in the ESCs 
altogether 340 subjects were taught. These basic courses dealt mainly with 
economic, legal, political, historical, sociological, cultural, linguistic and other 
aspects in the framework of covering one semester or more. In the 12 ESCs these 
subjects supplemented the professional training programs of the higher education 
institutions concerned. We can say that in Hungarian higher education, students at 
virtually every university and college could choose from a large number of 
independent courses on European integration, and in the majority of subjects 
relating to their specialization they have access to the necessary knowledge in the 
form of independent courses. 
From the point of view of the PHARE program, support for training in 
specialized language was important, to enable students to master the terminology 
relating to integration in the main official EU languages, and the language of 
professional communication in connection with the given branches of knowledge. 
This is achieved partly through high-level mastery of specialized language within 
the framework of language teaching, and partly by teaching certain subjects in the 
foreign language.  
The development of specializations in European integration as part of basic 
higher education courses is the next level. In addition to the teaching of integration 
subjects in basic courses, this means courses where and students received some 
form of certification in it. The program of these specializations and special fields 
follows the structure of similar European courses, and in some cases they lead to 
the equivalent of a Master’s degree of European Integration. The first 5-year 
university training program in European studies began in the academic year 2000-
2001 in Szombathely. Since the start of Bologna process many other universities 
started European studies program both on Bachelor and on Master level. 
Postgraduate training in European integration for experts who already have 
a university degree were also launched at virtually every studies centre. This 
training can take several possible forms. Further training in special fields 
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(specialized economist, specialized engineer, specialized jurist, etc.) may include 
European integration courses, which appear on the diploma and give a “Europe 
specialist” qualification in the given restricted field (agricultural or tax expert). To 
those who have a university degree but not necessarily the given basic 
qualification, the universities offer so-called “Europe expert” diplomas. 
Doctoral training programs have begun, mostly as specialisation.  Up till 
now doctoral schools in European studies have not been accredited in Hungary 
simply because the law on higher education does not regard “European studies” as 
an independent field of knowledge. A handful of students at most institutions are 
working on Ph.D. topics relating to European integration, but these topics are all 
linked to already accredited doctoral programs. 
Doctoral programs are aimed mainly at the training of university teachers 
and researchers, but obviously people with such a depth of expertise can find good 
jobs in the practical sphere as well and also enjoy the prestige of the academic 
degree. It is no accident that there is great interest in doctoral programs on the part 
of people working in the state administration.  
With the establishment of the centres a new situation has evolved in 
Hungary with regard to teaching and research in the field of European studies.  
1. First of all we must mention the growing intellectual and physical 
capacity, the importance of which cannot be overestimated. The basis 
for this was provided by the few dozen qualified teachers and 
researchers who had already been engaged in teaching and research 
activity in the area of European studies, had gained academic degrees 
in this field and were well known through their international contacts. 
They have been joined by those who in the past years have launched 
new courses, added European studies to their earlier courses and 
become proficient in these and the related topics. It is difficult to give 
precise figures, since many people work together on a particular course 
or research topic, and a sizeable number of Ph.D. students have also 
been involved, but I think it is no exaggeration to say that in Hungarian 
higher education the number of people seriously engaged in European 
studies is about 250-300. This is a remarkable amount of intellectual 
capacity. 
2. With the establishment of the centres, the physical, infrastructure 
capacity supporting these activities has also developed. In the case of 
several centres the bases for these were the former Documentation 
Centres, where important stocks of literature and documents and 
computer and informatics bases were created. These were further 
developed by the PHARE program, and with a few exceptions the 
centres were provided with premises in the universities, together with 
the necessary infrastructure.  
3.  It is important that education relating to European integration and the 
EU should really reflect the multidisciplinary nature of “European 
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studies”, which is internationally recognized. We know that it consists 
of a marriage of law, economics, political science, sociology, history 
and the cultural sciences (European culture). Various branches of 
language studies can also be related to it. It is notable that this multi-
disciplinarity is characteristic of most of the universities and centres, 
with differences that of course traditional earlier strengths in certain 
fields and the academic profile of the faculties responsible determine 
the main emphases. But law, economics and politics are given greater 
or less emphasis everywhere.  
4. The comprehensive nature of the network of centres means that in 
practice ESCs operate in the great majority of Hungary’s higher 
education institutions, or are linked to them in some way. This means, 
and this cannot be sufficiently emphasized, that in Hungary today, as a 
result of the program of support, students in higher education have 
access to European integration studies, and in fact can take courses in 
these in their own institutions. Total area and regional cover is 
provided, since European Studies Centres are in operation in all 
Hungary’s provincial university towns. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In the last 20 years, the Hungarian economy has become one of the most 
globalised economies of the world. The high globalisation means, in fact, a high 
Europanisation of Hungarian economy. In Hungary after 20 years of 
transformation the capitalistic ownership relations are consolidated, the new 
capitalist class can be considered to be established. The other part are the present 
managers and technocrats of TNCs and national as well, bankers and working in 
different fields of economic life. Some of them are crucial figures of economic elite 
as far as they sit in strategic positions of decision making. There is a great number 
of journalists, who play particularly important role in forming public opinion in 
economic and business matters. The trends of increasing social gaps in relations to 
transformation and globalisation of Central and Eastern Europe is also affecting the 
elite. The Hungarian elite is Europeanised, but divided. While they are fighting and 
competing, at the same time, they are compromising and cooperating. 
Development European Studies Centres in Hungary helped the birth and training 
the elite. 
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